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BAR BRIEFS

195

appeal papers. The city may now proceed with its improvements without any of the embarrassment and without any of the delay which would
have been encountered if the remedy of declaration of right had not
been available."
It has seemed to us, during the past two years, that the remedy
could and should have been resorted to in order to obtain judicial construction of the meaning of the term "loss" as contained in the 1927
amendment of the compensation law, to avoid the delay which has
occurred in payments to claimants whose permanent injuries have
resulted in stiffness of joints instead of severance, and to avoid numerous separate appeals.
PRESUMPTIONS
How frequently one reads the following in the opinion of a court
of last resort: "The findings of the trial court are presumed to be
correct," or "There is some evidence to support the judgment of the
trial court, hence it must be affirmed."
Undoubtedly a long line of decisions support the position taken.
Even where the reviewing court might have arrived at a different result
if originally tried before it, yet if there is not a clear preponderance of
the evidence against the findings, the judgment will not be disturbed.
The reason for such a rule is set out in Ott vs. Boring, 121 N. W. 126, as
follows: "It is recognized that there are many things which cannot be
spread upon the printed record, but may properly be considered by a
trial court and are of great, and often controlling, significance in determining the truth as between conflicts from the mouths of witnesses. As
experience shows, and from the very nature of things, justice is much
more likely to be done by leaning pretty strongly upon the initial determination than by endeavoring to treat a disputed matter from an original
standpoint. Hence the rule that there must not only be a preponderance
of evidence against such determination, but there must be a clear preponderance. The significance of the word 'clear' is not always fully
appreciated. Manifestly, that requires the preponderance to be so
apparent as to manifestly outweigh any probable legitimate influence
upon the triers of those advantages for discovering the truth which the
reviewing tribunal cannot have."
Yet, judging by what we occasionally hear, the thing that seems to
impress lawyers as well as laymen is the alleged fact that, in the everyday consideration of questions by human beings acting in the capacity
of trial judges, final judgments occasionally may be entered upon the
basis of a bad breakfast, or an uncanny ability to determine political
ground tremors, as well as upon fair and equitable application and
consideration of fundamental legal principles as related to evidentiary
facts; and as these things can no more appear in the record than some
other matters, they come away from the court of last resort with a feeling
that the real issues involved in their particular case are virtually left
unsolved, and the fact that "justice is more likely to be done by leaning
pretty strongly upon the initial determination than by endeavoring to
treat a disputed matter from an original standpoint" makes little or no
appeal to them. It is easy enough to make a broad application of law and
legal principles, so long as they affect the other lawyer or the other lawyer's clients, but it isn't so easy to make the application or to acknowledge
its correctness when our own interests or those of our clients are
adversely affected.

